This paper deals with the non-temporal use of the future in Italian known as 'epistemic' or 'presumptive' (PF) in declaratives and interrogatives. We first distinguish PF from epistemic necessity and possibility, as well as from weak necessity modals, providing in the process the main empirical challenges PF raises. We then propose and justify a semantic account that treats PF as a special normality modal that involves a subjective likelihood component. Since in our account the prejacent (the proposition in the scope of the modal) is at issue, the use of PF triggers the implicature that the speaker is not in a position to appeal to what she knows in order to support her commitment to the prejacent. This, we claim, is the source of the intuition that PF is often used to offer a "guess" relative to the question under discussion (QUD).
Introduction
Languages use a variety of means to signal modulated epistemic commitment to a proposition, such as epistemic modals (Gianni may/must be home), normality modals (Gianni ought to be home), and likelihood expressions (Gianni is likely to be home). In this paper, we provide an analysis of the non-temporal uses of the future tense in Italian which have been argued to involve such modulated epistemic commitment.
The future tense in Italian has an ordinary temporal use, exemplified in (1).
(1) Gianni Gianni sarà will-be a at casa home domani. tomorrow Gianni will be at home tomorrow. This morphological form also has a non-temporal use, called here the presumptive future (PF), which allows co-occurrence with non-future temporal adverbs, exemplified in (2) and (3). In such cases, the future acquires a "presumptive" or "epistemic" reading. 1 (2)
Gianni Gianni sarà will-be a at casa home adesso. now Gianni is presumably home now.
(3)
Gianni Gianni sarà will-have stato been a at casa home ieri. yesterday Gianni was presumably at home yesterday.
Because of the non-future adverbs, examples (2) and (3) can only receive a presumptive interpretation, according to which the speaker expresses her best guess with respect to Gianni's whereabouts.
As illustrated in (4) -(6), PF occurs in both polar and interrogative sentences as well:
(4)
Where is Gianni? Below we first differentiate PF from epistemic and weak necessity modals (Sections 2 and 3). We then give our proposal in Section 4, and discuss PF in interrogatives in Section 5; Section 6 concludes.
PF is not an epistemic modal
In this section we show that PF must be distinguished from both epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility.
PF is different from epistemic necessity It has been claimed in the literature (e.g. Giannakidou & Mari (2013) ) that PF has the semantics of a necessity epistemic modal, like must in English and dovere in Italian. In this section we show that PF and must/dovere differ in distribution and therefore must be distinguished analytically.
Note first that in (7), while a doctor could felicitously report her inference about the patient's health on the basis of the available evidence by using the epistemic necessity modal must/dovere, an utterance with PF would sound odd. The intuition is that PF is inappropriate because it suggests that the doctor is making a guess rather than an inference based on information she has.
The second case we consider is (8), modified from Mandelkern (2018) . It shows that when the speaker knows that the inference to been drawn is true, must/dovere is acceptable, but PF is not. While the use of PF here is perfectly natural, the epistemic necessity modal is odd.
We have illustrated above both cases where epistemic necessity modals are acceptable but PF is not, and the reverse. We turn now to a comparison with possibility modals.
PF differs from epistemic possibility We show below that PF must be distinguished from the epistemic possibility modal might/potere. Example (11) shows that when the speaker entertains multiple epistemic possibilities, she can report this by using an epistemic possibility modal but not PF.
(11) MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES
Where is Maria? Based on the data discussed in this section, we conclude that PF is not an epistemic necessity modal of the must/dovere kind, nor an epistemic possibility modal of the might/potere type. Note also that these data challenge an analysis of PF as a variable-force modal, proposed by Mari (2010) , as well as an analysis of PF as a mere likelihood modal. As for the former, if PF were a variable-force modal of the kind described by Rullmann, Matthewson & Davis (2008) and Matthewson (2013) , one would expect it to be felicitous in contexts that allow epistemic possibility modals as well as epistemic necessity modals. This, as we have seen, is not the case.
An analysis that treats PF as a likelihood modal can capture the fact that its force is somewhat stronger than epistemic possibility (as in the BEST ALTERNATIVE and MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES scenarios), as well as the unacceptability of PF in the MATH case. Crucially, however, a likelihood analysis cannot explain (i) why PF is not appropriate in the DOCTOR scenario, a context in which, as (13) shows, a likelihood modal is appropriate, and (ii) why PF is appropriate in the IGNORANCE case, a context in which a likelihood modal is not felicitous, as shown in (14) Given the data presented in the preceding two sections, the account of PF has to capture its epistemic flavor without treating it as an epistemic modal. Furthermore, it has to account for the similarities between PF and weak necessity modals while also explaining their differences. We turn to this task in the next section.
Proposed analysis
Because of the similarity between PF and weak necessity modals our starting point is Yalcin's account of the latter. Yalcin (2016) proposes to treat the weak necessity modals should/ought to as normality modals: α should F means that it would be normal, all relevant things considered, for α to F. In this treatment, weak necessity modals are not epistemic; their epistemic flavor is the result of a default inference from what is normally the case to what is presumably the case (cf. Veltman (1996) ). In the account to be developed below, PF has a normality component which gives rise to its epistemic flavor in the same way as in Yalcin's proposal. The differences between normality modals and PF are captured by imposing further requirements on the latter.
Informally, our proposal is that a sentence of the form PF(p)/PF(p)? asserts/questions whether p is subjectively more likely than any of its contextually supplied alternatives, where likelihood is assessed based on what is normally the case at the world and the time of evaluation for the speaker in declaratives, and the addressee in interrogatives. This semantics is given formally in (21) for declaratives:
] f is the focus semantic value of the prejacent; (ii) i is a variable contextually bound by the speaker in declaratives and the addressee in interrogatives (iii) N(i)(w)(t) = {p ∈ P(W): i believes that p is normally the case in w at t}; (iv) for any propositions p, q ∈ P(W): p > N(i)(w)(t) q iff p is more likely than q w.r.t. what i believes is normally the case in w at t.
From these truth conditions it follows that in declaratives, the speaker's commitment to the prejacent is not based on knowledge but rather on her subjective assessment of what is most likely, given what is normally the case. This explains the infelicity of PF in the DOCTOR context: the patient expects the doctor to make a knowledgebased claim. A PF utterance, however, is not such a claim, and therefore it will be understood as communicating that the speaker is not in a position to make any knowledge-based claims. More generally, PF is predicted to be infelicitous in contexts in which the prejacent is at issue and the speaker is in a position to make a knowledge-based claim about it. This is so because a modalized statement relying on an epistemic base is informationally more reliable than one that is constructed from a normality base. Epistemic accessibility functions are reflexive and therefore w, the world of evaluation, must be an element of the epistemic base given by such a function. Normality accessibility functions are not reflexive, and therefore w is not necessarily an element of a normality modal base: w may well turn out not to be a normal world. This property makes normality bases informationally less reliable than epistemic bases. The strongest normality based claim, N p, may be true in w without p being true in w. Thus, under the assumption grounded in the Gricean maxim of Quality that a cooperative speaker supports her statements on the most reliable information available, if the speaker can support a claim based on an epistemic base, she should do so, and if she does not, one concludes that such a base is not available to her. In the DOCTOR scenario, it is pragmatically odd for the speaker to make a normality based statement (with a weak necessity modal or PF) because, in that context, the doctor is supposed to attempt to give a diagnosis on the basis of the medical facts that she is aware of. There are, however, circumstances when guessing is appropriate, such as in the following modified DOCTOR scenario:
(22) Our doctor is having a private informal conversation with another doctor, who asks her what is the matter with Maria. She replies:
Non Not mi me raccapezzo.... find-way....
Sarà
Will-be narcolessia. narcolepsy I can't figure it out... It could be narcolepsy.
In this scenario, the doctor is free to express her subjective guess since she is not expected to provide an informed, professional opinion. Note next that our account predicts that PF(p) is consistent with the speaker having some evidence against p, as in (23) He will be at the office, even though when I heard from him on the phone yesterday he sounded sick.
The infelicity of PF in the MATH scenario follows as well: conclusions in mathematical arguments have to be based on objectively true mathematical premises.
Note now that, according to (21), in order for the likelihood relation > to be defined (avoiding trivially true or trivially false statements), both arguments of > must be different from / 0. In order to ensure this, it must be the case that p and all its alternatives in C are compatible with DOX i (w). This explains the contrast between PF and the weak necessity modal in (20). The crucial difference is that the weak necessity modal has a simpler semantics that does not require its prejacent to be compatible with DOX speaker in declarative sentences. This point is confirmed by the fact that asserting PF(p) does not rule out other doxastic alternatives, as shown in the following variant of the IGNORANCE case. Note, however, that it is odd to assert PF(p) immediately after raising the possibility of a different alternative, as shown in (25) We suggest that (25) is odd because it is an odd pragmatic move to bring up a possibility as a possible answer to a question only to then dismiss it immediately afterwards. In support of this claim, note that (26), where (a) and (b) are uttered by different discourse participants, shows that if the epistemic possibility is brought up by one speaker, another speaker may use PF raising a different possibility while agreeing that the first one is not excluded. Finally, note that our analysis accounts for the MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES and BEST ALTERNATIVE cases. In the former, PF is incompatible with the conjunction of multiple possibilities because it requires the prejacent to be the likeliest alternative, which ensures uniqueness. In the latter, PF is acceptable because the speaker's claiming that the prejacent is the most subjectively likely true answer to the QUD (given what is normally the case) is compatible with the requirement that all alternatives be doxastically possible.
What is at issue?
In our account, at the point that PF(p) is asserted, the QUD consists of p and its alternatives in C. And yet, the speaker does not assert p, but rather, PF(p), which amounts to claiming that according to what the speaker believes is normally the case, p is the most likely alternative. A different analytical possibility would be to assume that PF does not affect the semantic content of the sentence, and therefore what is asserted is simply p; the contribution of PF would be to signal weakened commitment to p. Under this account PF would be treated as a speech act modifier, along the lines of the treatment of tag interrogatives and rising declaratives in Farkas & Roelofsen (2017) .
The reasons that led us to take PF to contribute to the semantic content of the sentence in which it occurs are the following. First, PF sentences may embed, as exemplified in (27) Assuming that agreement involves committing to the semantic content of the interlocutor's previous assertion, the data in (28) show that this content is PF(p), and not just p. Similarly, (29) shows that in disagreeing with a previous PF(p) statement, the speaker is not committing to ¬p but rather to ¬PF(p), which is why she may explicitly commit to the possibility of p being true. Finally, we turn to the question of whether the implicit i anchor in (21) is necessarily bound by the speaker in unembedded PF declaratives. Frana & Menèndez-Benito (2015) and Giannakidou & Mari (2013) ) argue that it is. Frana and Menèndez-Benito's example, modelled after an example in Kratzer (2009) , is given in (30): (30) Filing Cabinet None of us has had access to the information in this filing cabinet, but we know that it contains the complete evidence (including possibly forged evidence) about the murder of Philip Boyes and narrows down the set of suspects. We are betting on who might have killed Boyes according to the information in the filing cabinet. The difference between the unacceptable (30) and the acceptable (31) concerns, we claim, the nature of the anchor: in (30) the anchor is non-agentive, and therefore not able to assess the likelihood of a proposition, while in (31), it is agentive and capable of such assessment. We therefore conclude that PF is not necessarily speaker oriented.
Based on the arguments in this section we conclude that PF contributes to the semantic content of the sentence in which it occurs.
Interaction with negation
A possible challenge to the conclusion of the preceding subsection is the fact that PF appears to necessarily be interpreted under the scope of negation: In our account, the seeming impossibility of negation to take scope over PF is a by-product of the existence presupposition triggered by PF. Recall that according to (21), PF presupposes that there exists a unique alternative that is the most likely alternative in C given what is normally the case. Because of this presupposition, ¬PF(p) is equivalent to PF(¬p). To see why, consider first the case in which the set of alternatives is {p, ¬p}. In this case, asserting that it is not the case that p is the most likely alternative (given what is normally the case), the presupposition that there is a most likely alternative entails that this most likely alternative is ¬p.
For cases where C contains more alternatives, the same result is reached, under the assumption that the alternatives in C are mutually exclusive. For example, suppose that the issue is Gianni's whereabouts, and suppose that there are three possible mutually exclusive alternatives {Gianni is at home, Gianni is at the office, Gianni is at the gym} (or, in short, {home, office, gym}).
(33) Where is Gianni?
Sono
It-is le the 6. 6.
Non Not sarà will-be in in ufficio. office It's 6 o'clock. He would not be at the office.
In (33), the speaker asserts that it is not the case that office is the most likely alternative. Given the presupposition contributed by PF (that there is a most likely alternative in C), it follows from ¬PF(office) that one of the other alternatives is the most likely one. Since the alternatives are mutually exclusive, it follows that the most likely alternative, whichever it might be, entails that not-office is true. In our account then, ¬PF(p) and PF(¬p) are equivalent, and this equivalence is responsible for the illusion of fixed scope relative to negation. This concludes our discussion of PF in declaratives. We turn to interrogatives in the next section.
PF in interrogatives
We assume a semantics for interrogatives according to which the denotation of an interrogative is the set of propositions that constitute its complete possible answers. We exemplify schematically with the denotation of a polar interrogative PF sentence in (34) .
The positive answer to the interrogative commits its speaker to the proposition PF(p), whereas the negative answer commits its speaker to ¬PF(p). This is illustrated in (35) Note that the negative answer in (35) is understood obligatorily with narrow scope negation for the reasons explained in section 4.2.
Following the literature on evidentials, such as Murray (2010) , we assume that the anchor of PF becomes the addressee in interrogatives via "interrogative flip". The account predicts that in a PF interrogative, the addressee is not assumed to know the answer to the QUD. To see that this prediction is correct, compare the LACK OF COMPETENCE case in (36) with the QUIZ case in (37).
(36) Two egyptologists have just discovered a sarcophagus. It contains a mummy.
One egyptologist says to the other: 
Versailles? Versailles
In what year would the treaty of Versailles have been signed?
PF is acceptable in (36) because the addressee (one of the two egyptologists) is not assumed to know whether the mummy is a man or a woman. In (37), on the other hand, PF is inappropriate because in quiz contexts the addressee cannot be assumed not to know the answer to the question. Note, however, that if the context is as in (38) Finally, (39) shows that in contexts in which the addressee is presupposed to know whether the prejacent is true, PF is infelicitous:
(39) Maria is talking on the phone with her sister Anna who she hasn't spoken to in years. The question in (39) becomes felicitous in situations where the addressee is absent (as in a written communication). In this case, the question can be interpreted as self-addressed, and PF is felicitous. We conclude that the semantics of PF developed in Section 4 extends to interrogatives without further modification.
Conclusion and open issues
To summarize, we argued that PF in Italian contributes a normality base (a property it shares with normality modals), a subjective likelihood component, and a presupposition that plays a crucial role in accounting for discourse properties of PF sentences, and for the interaction of PF with negation. We argued that what is at issue when a PF sentence is uttered is the prejacent proposition. Since what is at issue is the truth of the prejacent, the use of PF will trigger the implicature that the speaker is not in a position to appeal to what she knows in order to support her commitment to the prejacent. Hence, the observation that PF is often used to offer a "guess" to answer the QUD. The proposed account covers PF in both declarative and interrogative sentences, and predicts the possibility of its occurrence in embedded contexts, though the constraints on embedded PF have not been explored here.
There are two further non-temporal uses of the future in Italian that have been discussed in the literature (cf. Squartini (2012) ). The first is its use in rejecting echo exclamatives exemplified in (40a).
(40) a. A:
A:
Sei you-are stupido. stupid.
B: B:
Stupido Stupid sarai will-be tu! you A: You are stupid. B: You are the stupid one.
The second, more widely attested in other languages, is the future used in concessives, exemplified in (41b):
(41) a. Gianni studied for days.
b. Avrà
Will-have pure also studiato studied per for giorni, days, però but non not ha has comunque anyways passato passed l'esame. the-exam He might have studied for days, but he still failed the exam.
We leave to the future a discussion of whether and how these occurrences are connected to the ones we have discussed in this paper.
Going beyond Italian, there are several important questions that remain open. The first is whether one can find a principled explanation for why in Italian, as well as in many other languages, it is the future tense that allows the presumptive meaning we have investigated here. Answering this question will require one to consider and compare existing theories of the temporal future (cf. Copley (2009 ), Kaufmann (2005 , Cariani & Santorio (2017) among others). The second question concerns the differences among presumptive uses of the future cross-linguistically. Finally, we leave open the question of how PF compares with particles such as wohl in German or darou in Japanese, which have similar though not identical effects. Common to all these forms is that they are used as means of nuancing commitment to the prejacent. As such, the question of connections with evidential systems also arises. Accounting for the non-temporal use of the future in a particular language, as we have done above, provides, we hope, the basis for future explorations of the semantics of PF across languages.
